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Policy Backlash: Measuring the Effect of Policy Venues using Public 
Opinion 
 
Scott Barclay*  
Andrew R. Flores**  
INTRODUCTION  
What happens to popular opinion after controversial, new policy positions are 
introduced as law is an essential part of understanding of the role of law as a means 
of changing individual behavior as well as the efficacy of social movement action in 
utilizing law to achieve desired policy goals in the face of entrenched and organized 
resistance. The answer to this question is of such singular importance that, as new 
movements emerge, it often dominates their initial discussions as they plan their 
tactics and the policy venues in which to pursue them. 
Social movements have good reason to be highly interested in the answer. 
Legal scholars and political scientists have raised the prospect of a “backlash” in 
which the success of a new social movement in bringing about a new policy can, 
paradoxically, be the very catalyst that generates a popular reaction that leads not 
only to a revocation of the current policy by policymakers but the introduction of a 
more draconian version of the prior policy as well as the purging of more permissive 
social norms.1 Accordingly, activists within newly emerging social movements and 
interest groups aligned with those movements are often advised to avoid utilizing 
legal change to achieve policy goals for fear of detracting from any positive effects 
previously achieved through the actions of social movements in altering the larger 
cultural discourse.2 
I. TWO ASPECTS OF POLICY BACKLASH 
Policy backlash has two aspects that are of particular interest to social 
movements as they engage in strategy and planning.  
A. Policy Venue 
The first aspect relates to the choice of policy venues: Is backlash more likely 
to occur in some policy venues rather than others? For example, some legal scholars 
have argued that policy making through judicial action is more likely to create the 
                                                 
* Professor, School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Arizona State University 
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1  Representative of legal scholars, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: 
COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013). Representative of political 
scientists, see, e.g., Donald P. Haider-Markel, Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative 
Influence of Descriptive Representation, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 107, 129 (2007).  
2  See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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conditions fertile to subsequent policy backlash, but the proposition remains highly 
contested within academic circles.3  
The presumption is that judges, who are appointed to the federal courts, as 
well as judges on some of the states’ highest courts are more likely to act in direct 
contradiction to popular opinion as part of the counter-majoritarian tradition 
accorded courts.4 In contrast, popularly elected legislators are thought to be less 
inclined to act in direct contradiction to the popular will of the moment.5 There is an 
inherent logic to such an approach since, simply from consideration of electoral 
incentives, we might expect state legislators or congresspersons to ensure that the 
policies they newly enact accurately reflect changing social attitudes; a noted 
disjuncture between adopted policy positions and the popular position on a policy 
issue could easily leave elected officials vulnerable to future electoral challenge.6 
B. Duration of Effect 
The second aspect relates to the duration of any effect: Is backlash more likely 
to represent only a temporary shock to an existing trend or is it reflective of a longer-
term reorientation in popular support? For example, some political scientists have 
questioned the long-term efficacy of policy change itself when it involves socially 
divisive issues and it is enacted primarily through judicial action.7 For social 
movements, the difference between a temporary setback and a long-term reversal 
could be definitive to the chances of eventually achieving desired goals.  
In this Article, we use empirical data as analyzed through a statistical model 
to measure the effect of policy venues on policy backlash as well as offer insight on 
                                                 
3  Arguing in favor of the idea that judicial involvement increases the likelihood of policy backlash on 
socially divisive issues: see, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBER, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICHIGAN L. 
REV. 431, 431–89 (2005). Challenging this approach, see generally, Benjamin G. Bishin, Thomas J. 
Hayes, Matthew B. Incantalup & Charles Anthony Smith, Opinion Backlash and Public Attitudes: Are 
Institutional Advances in Gay Rights Counterproductive?, 00 AMERICAN J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2015); Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE 
L. J. 2028, 2033 (2011); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions 
on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 151, 151–52 (2009); Rebecca J. Kreitzer, Allison J. Hamilton & 
Caroline J. Tolbert, Does Policy Adoption Change Opinions on Minority Rights? The Effects of 
Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, 67 POL. RES. Q. 795, 796 (2014); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe 
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373–433 (2007); 
Richard S. Price & Thomas M. Keck, Movement Litigation and Unilateral Disarmament, Paper 
Presented at Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association (March 2013) 
4  For a counter position based on empirical evidence, see Scott Barclay, In Search of Judicial Activism in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Cases: Sorting the Evidence from Courts, Legislatures, Initiatives and 
Amendments, 8 PERSP. ON POL., 111, 114 (2010); Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. 
Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AMERICAN J. OF POL. SCI. 74, 75 
(2011). 
5   KLARMAN, supra note 1, at 167–68. 
6  This form of logic underpinned the famous 1974 book by the political scientist, David Mayhew. See 
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004).  
7  See, e.g., GARY MUCCIARONI, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT POLITICS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN STRUGGLES OVER 
GAY RIGHTS (2008); ROSENBERG, supra note 2. 
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the duration of any resultant effect. Specifically, we use annual, state-level public 
opinion estimates of support of marriage equality in the fifty states from 1992 
through 2015 introduced into a cross-sectional time-series regression model designed 
to consider the impact on popular support of the introduction of state laws, state court 
decisions, and the successful ratification of state-wide constitutional amendments 
around marriage equality. The introduction of same-sex marriage in the 1990s and 
2000s, alongside the introduction of racial integration into education in the 1950s and 
abortion rights in the 1970s, is often identified by researchers as a textbook example 
of a policy change that can be expected to generate policy backlash.8 
II. DEFINING POLICY BACKLASH   
According to the current literature on policy backlash, public support for a new 
policy on a socially divisive topic is thought to decline, often increasingly so, after the 
introduction of the policy change itself. In many ways, this is counter-intuitive since 
the relevant social movement, interest groups, and supportive policymakers 
obviously had sufficient backing initially to convince some set of policymakers, 
whether courts or legislators, to adopt their desired policy. The logical presumption 
would be that prior trends of support continue, or even increase, after the formal 
adoption of the policy. Instead, the literature on backlash proposes that the 
introduction of a new law, reflecting a new approach to these socially divisive topics, 
generates a crystallization of popular opinion that fosters a subsequent increase in 
opposition to the prior policy change. The new law becomes simultaneously a focusing 
event and a rallying point that facilitates opposition to the new policy, such that there 
is a decline over time in the level of support for the earlier policy change.  
Policy backlash is often demarcated in the current literature by a sufficient 
popular reaction as to lead to a revocation by policymakers of the current policy and/or 
the introduction of a counter policy.9 Yet, the approach does not by necessity require 
a complete policy reversal for backlash to be evidenced. Instead, backlash can be also 
more broadly defined, as Bishin et al. have proposed defining backlash as “a large 
negative and enduring shift in opinion against a policy or group that occurs in 
response to some event that threatens the status quo.”10 
It is this latter definition that we rely upon in this article, primarily because it 
allows backlash as a phenomenon to be separated conceptually from policy diffusion— 
that is, the more normalized spread of a policy response to a newly emerging policy 
                                                 
8  On racial integration, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).  On abortion rights, see, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, 
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (2006).  But note the empirical challenge 
to the evidence for backlash on abortion rights offered in Post & Siegel, supra note 3; Greenhouse & 
Siegel, supra note 3. On same sex marriage, see, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 1; MUCCIARONI, supra note 
7; ROSENBERG, supra note 3. 
9  MUCCIARONI, supra note 7, at 112–13; ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 75–82; Haider-Markel, supra note 1, 
at 112–13. 
10  Bishin et al., supra note 3, at 626.   
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issue.11 In addition, it removes the unnecessary threshold of requiring the reaction to 
generate sufficient counter-pressure to revoke the existing policy change. Finally, it 
offers the potential to re-situate the idea of backlash in the normal discussion of 
popular and policy responses to focusing events.12 
In the present Article, we also constrain the understanding of backlash to the 
consideration of the effects on popular opinion within the original jurisdiction that 
passed the new policy into law.13  Many current policy backlash models, especially 
those focused on same-sex marriage, have identified the introduction of new legal 
restrictions outside of the original jurisdiction as offering evidence of a backlash 
against the original policy change.14 As such, proponents of this model often fail to 
demonstrate either a reversal of the policy change within the original jurisdiction 
and/or a decline in popular opinion within that same jurisdiction.15 The problem with 
this approach is that new legal restrictions outside of the original jurisdiction are 
equally likely to occur as a result of normal within-state policy processes or as a result 
of policy diffusion more generally.16  
In keeping with a state-centric approach to policy backlash, we adopt the 
proposition that states individually determined whether to engage with marriage 
equality as well as the timing and policy direction they subsequently pursued.17 In 
contrast to a national-level approach, which would posit that all states are responding 
to a single, common policy enactment, we treat federal action on this policy issue as 
largely separate and removed in its expected effects from action involving the specific 
state’s population. Notwithstanding ongoing congressional debate on the issue and 
the successful passage in 1996 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act,18 policymaking 
on marriage equality almost exclusively involved state-level action. It is only after 
2013 that the federal courts truly began to emerge as the determinative actors in 
defining the validity of the array of state-level policy changes that were already 
underway. Accordingly, we focus only on state legislative action, state judicial action, 
and state constitutional amendments rather than more recent decisions by the 
federal courts. 
 
                                                 
11  Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 841 
(2008) (discussing policy diffusion). 
12  THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS 22 
(1997) (discussing the role of focusing events in influencing policy making). 
13  Compare Haider-Markel, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the influence of LGBT state legislators on 
LGBT-related legislation and policy backlash), with Birkland, supra note 12, at 4.  
14  Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 10, 72, with Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex 
Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WILLIAM & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1493, 1493–95 (2006) (discussing that more attention should be paid to legislative and political 
arenas regarding policy backlash). 
15  Price & Keck, supra note 3, at 881, 883. 
16  Much of the proposed impact associated with policy backlash resemble the normal mechanisms of 
policy diffusion across states. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 11, at 841–43. 
17  Barclay, supra note 4, at 114, 116. 
18  Federal Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
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III. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AS A POLICY ISSUE AT THE STATE-LEVEL 
Marriage equality is an apt policy issue through which to consider the question 
of the effects of policy backlash. Since its strong re-emergence in the wake of the 1993 
Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v Lewin,19 this policy issue has evidenced 
policy change at the state level, both proscribing marriage equality and permitting 
marriage equality.  
For the current purposes, marriage equality also offers sufficient time after the 
enactment of each policy change to generate meaningful statistical insights; that is, 
there is sufficient variation over time for effects to be evidenced. From the point in 
time when the first states introduce each policy change, there exists at least a decade 
of subsequent data on popular opinion. For example, by 1995, four states had enacted 
statutes proscribing recognition of marriage equality. By July 2000, Vermont had 
enacted civil unions.20  By December 2002, three states had state constitutional 
amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. And, by May 2004, Massachusetts had 
enacted same-sex marriage.21   
Figure One, below, represents the changing legal positions from 1992 through 
2014 across states around the four major legal actions associated with marriage 
equality: two proscribing same-sex marriage and two permitting relationship 
recognition for same-sex couples.  
Prior to 1992, only a select few states, California and Maryland among the 
most notable, had any restriction on the recognition or celebration of same-sex 
marriages formalized into law.22 In fact, rarely was such a proscriptive policy even 
formalized within administrative rules for the state agency responsible for regulating 
the criteria for marriage. If such a policy restriction existed, it was an accidental by-
product of specifying the number of parties to a marriage; generated initially by 
earlier state action to proscribe polygamous marriages.23  
Starting in the early 1990s, most, but certainly not all, states developed a new 
policy designed specifically to proscribe the recognition or celebration of same-sex 
marriages. This policy change was subsequently introduced via statute, ballot 
initiative, state court decision, and /or state constitutional amendment—in some 
states, by all of the above methods and in most other states, by two or more of these 
methods. In the twenty-two year period between January 1992 and January 2014, 
                                                 
19  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65–68 (1993). 
20  Barclay, supra note 4, Table 1. 
21  Id. 
22  Scott Barclay & Shauna F. Fisher, The States and the Differing Impetus for Divergent Paths on Same-
Sex Marriage, 1990-2001, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 331, 335 (2003). 
23  William Eskridge has written extensively around this point. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY 
PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 1 (2002); William N. Eskridge Jr., A History of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.1419, 1472–72 (1993). 
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thirty-seven states introduced statutory prohibitions and thirty states passed state 
constitutional amendments prohibiting state recognition of same-sex marriage.24 
In contrast, a small number of states permitted the recognition and celebration 
of same-sex marriages or civil unions (or an equivalent such as fully comprehensive 
versions of domestic partnerships or similar wide-ranging recognition for same-sex 
relationships).25 This new policy was subsequently incorporated into the formal law 
via statute, ballot initiative, state court decision, and/or federal court decision. In the 
twenty-two year period between January 1992 and January 2014, nineteen states 
introduced legal recognition of same-sex marriage and nine states introduced legal 
recognition of civil unions (or an equivalent, such as comprehensive domestic 
partnerships).26 Prior to this action, most states had no such comprehensive 
relationship recognition for same-sex couples formalized into law.  
In the chosen time period, many states adopted only one of these policy 
changes, either prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriage, or conversely 
permitting same-sex marriage or civil unions. However, thirteen states—California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington—proscribed marriage equality and, 
notwithstanding this earlier policy enactment, the same state later reversed its 
position in order to introduce either marriage equality or civil unions.27  
 
  
                                                 
24  Andrew R. Flores & Scott Barclay, Trends in Public Support for Marriage for Same-sex Couples by 
State, WILLIAMS INS. https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Trends-in-Public-
Support-for-Same-Sex-Marriage-2004-2014.pdf (Apr. 2015). 
25  Id.  
26  Id. 
27  Barclay, supra note 4, at 114. 
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Figure One: The 50 States and the Two Major Policy Change around Marriage 
Equality28 
 
 
IV. GENERATING ANNUAL STATE-LEVEL PUBLIC OPINION ESTIMATES 
In order to consider the effects of policy change on subsequent levels of popular 
support within each of the fifty states, we generated state-level public opinion 
estimates of support of marriage equality for each year from 1992 through 2015 for 
each of the fifty states. Actual polling of a sample of a state’s adult population is rare 
and it is usually conducted only at the height of an active political campaign on the 
policy issue. This preference of the timing of state-level polling introduces a potential 
selective bias into both its availability and its reported results.  
To overcome this limitation on the availability of state-level polling data, we 
turned to a well-established, statistical procedure: multilevel regression and 
poststratification (e.g., (MRP)). It utilizes national survey data, which tends to be 
collected with greater regularity, to effectively model state-level opinion on highly 
salient policy issues. As such, MRP has previously been used by political scientists to 
generate reliable sub-national, opinion estimates from accumulated, geo-coded, 
                                                 
28  This graph was created through original research by the authors related to this Article. 
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national-level polling data.29 And, more importantly, it has empirically proven to 
produce state-level opinion estimates that are both consistent and reliable in relation 
to policy issues involving lesbian and gay rights, including the question of marriage 
equality.30  
MRP, as a statistical technique, allows us to simply “marry” two pieces of 
information—polling data representing the position of a wide variety of respondents 
in each state, and the demographic breakdown of similarly-situated individuals in 
each state—to generate consistent and reliable estimates of popular support of 
marriage equality among adults in each state in each year between 1992 and 2015.  
The geo-coded, national-level polling data was accumulated from two sources: 
(1) proprietary public opinion data obtained exclusively by the authors as part of their 
involvement in a big-data project at the Williams Institute at the UCLA School of 
Law; and (2) public opinion data from public sources, such as the data held by the 
Roper Center and ICPSR data archives. The combined data from these two sources 
allowed the authors to aggregate the current national-level data to generate large 
enough samples in each year to capture support for marriage equality in each state 
as it occurs within a variety of social demographic sub-groups.  
In the period between 1992 and 2013, national-level polling data that 
incorporated a question on marriage equality averaged 6,224 respondents per year, 
with a minimum of 801 respondents in 1995 and a maximum of 19,740 respondents 
in 2012. But, consistent with the increasing resonance of the issue over time with 
commensurate greater sampling on this issue, the sample size grew as time 
progressed—it averaged 2,545 per year in the years from 1992 through 2000, 8,001 
respondents per year in the years 2001 through 2010, and 11,333 for the remainder 
of the period.  
To accumulate this sample size, the authors used several versions of the survey 
question on marriage equality as were deployed across scientifically rigorous, 
national surveys throughout this period. There was great similarity in question 
wording across polling source as the proprietary surveys tended to closely emulate 
their public counterparts for enhanced data consistency. The authors independently 
conducted extensive statistical consideration of the effects created by differences in 
question wording and polling source. It revealed only limited variation of a random 
                                                 
29  MRP has been well-tested by political scientists. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay rights in the 
States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 368 (2009); Jeffrey R. 
Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148–49 (2012); 
Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys to Measure Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion: A Guideline 
for Scholars and an Application, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 415 (2011); David K. Park, Andrew 
Gelman, & Joseph Bafumi, Bayesian Multilevel Estimation with Poststratification: State-Level 
Estimates from National Polls, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 375, 375–76 (2004); Christopher Warshaw & Jonathan 
Rodden, How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues? 74 J. POL. 203, 
203–04 (2012). 
30  Matthew K. Buttice & Benjamin Highton, How Does Multilevel Regression and Poststratification 
Perform   with Conventional National Surveys?, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 449, 458 (2013); Jeffrey R. Lax & 
Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 107–
08 (2009).  
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nature, which did not indicate the possibility of introducing inherent bias into the 
sample from question selection.  
Current Population Survey data from the US Census Bureau determined the 
distribution of the relevant social demographic sub-groups in each time period in each 
state. Examples of such sub-groups might be: the number of college-educated, under-
thirty-five women in each respective state, or the number of over-sixty-five, African 
American men in each respective state. The utilization of these social demographic 
characteristics as a component in determining the values of the dependent variable 
makes us a little reticent about deploying them subsequently as part of our 
explanatory measures.31     
Although they are generated by a fairly complex means, underlying the 
resulting opinion estimates are the actual responses of respondents within the 
respective state reacting to the appropriate question in each respective year. 
Therefore, these opinion estimates reflect the peaks and troughs over time usually 
found in traditional public opinion polling on a policy issue. This fact is well 
demonstrated by Figure Two, which graphically displays the generated estimates of 
popular support for marriage equality in the State of New York in the period from 
1992 through 2015.  
Overall, the state-level estimates of support for marriage equality range from 
a minimum of twelve percent support in Mississippi in 2006 to a maximum of eighty 
percent support in the District of Columbia in 2013. According to these estimates, all 
states increased in their support for marriage equality over the twenty-two-year 
period from 1992 to 2014. There was an average rate of increase in support of 26.16% 
during this time period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Unique social demographics configuration affect and determine the state’s political culture.  See 
ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION 
AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 47 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993). Data exists on early application 
of social demographic factors to subsequent state policy actions on marriage equality. See Barclay & 
Fisher, supra note 22, at 339.  
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Figure Two: Opinion Estimates of Popular Support for Marriage Equality—New 
York32 
 
 
Fifteen states saw a twenty percent or less increase in support for marriage 
equality from 1992 through 2014 (from lowest to highest among the fifteen state 
group): Utah, South Carolina, Louisiana, North Dakota, West Virginia, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
Texas.  
Conversely, eighteen states and the District of Columbia saw an increase of 
thirty percent or more in support for marriage equality during this same period (from 
lowest to highest among the eighteen state group): California, Michigan, Montana, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Iowa, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Washington, Colorado, Maryland, Vermont, and 
Hawaii.  
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CAPTURING SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
ACTIVITY  
Our current analysis does not incorporate direct measures of the activities of 
social movements or interest groups around marriage equality. There are a number 
of reasons, both methodological and theoretical, for adopting this approach.  
First, despite their connection to a respective state, state-level groups were 
often assisted by a wide variety of national organizations.33 This assistance might 
                                                 
32  This graph was created through original research by the authors related to this Article. 
33  See generally AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 59–61 (Univ. of Minn. Press 2012).  
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include campaign expertise, polling information, campaign personnel, personnel 
training, and direct financial support for targeted media and voter outreach 
campaigns. On the pro-marriage equality side, these national organizations include, 
but are not limited to, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Human Rights 
Campaign, Freedom to Marry, Lambda Legal, ACLU, National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, and the Equality Federation. On the anti-marriage equality side, these 
national organizations include, but are not limited to, the National Organization for 
Marriage and the Family Research Council. Given the nature of these interventions, 
it is difficult to disentangle potentially meaningful variation in social movement 
capability at the state level.  
Another factor that confounds the ability to accurately account for influential 
social movement activity at the state level is the fact that the policy change occurs 
through different institutional mechanisms, often involving an array of policymakers 
pressured by a variety of social movement actions. Policy changes at the state level 
have been generated by one or more of the following: litigation in an array of state 
courts by cause lawyers on behalf of their respective movements, legislative action 
influenced by sustained interest group lobbying, the decisions of state attorney 
generals influenced by emerging legal precedent, gubernatorial prompting based on 
electoral calculations, as well as the multifarious motivations that underpin 
successful statewide popular initiatives and statewide referendums. Since these 
various movement activities are often occurring both contemporaneously and in 
reaction to one another, it can be difficult to discern the effective points of pressure 
exerted by individual elements of the larger social movement in this dynamic policy 
interaction.34 
Further, different institutional mechanisms for policy shift may become the 
province of specific movement organizations as movement organizations separate 
into disparate areas of expertise and focus in an attempt to avoid more direct 
competition with similarly-situated counterparts for the larger movement’s limited 
resources and supporters.35 Yet, due to intra-movement politics, these various 
organizations may act in only limited coordination and occasionally they will act in 
contradiction to the efforts of one another, even if they are all in pursuit of a single 
goal of marriage equality.36 Thus, even simple advances in policy might involve 
multiple social movement organizations; each with varying resource deployment at 
different times and each reflecting only a small component in a larger whole that is 
likely less than the sum of its collective parts.   
Finally, social movements almost always act in relation to counter-movements 
around the same policy issue. Certainly, that is true in the case of marriage 
                                                 
34  Scott Barclay & Shauna F. Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex Marriage Litigation, 
in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 84, 84–100 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 
Stanford Univ. Press 2006). 
35  Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement's 
Agenda, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1667, 1713 (2014). 
36  STONE, supra note 33, at 1713. 
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equality.37 In fact, the backlash model usually posits the actions of a counter-
movement as one of the factors that crystallizes popular opinion to turn against the 
new law.38  Measuring the overall effects from the combined effort of these two 
competing movements, especially absent movement capability measures, is 
problematic in the current context.   
To resolve these methodological and theoretical problems in ways that allows 
us to effectively capture the impact and dynamics of social movement effects, we begin 
from a simple assumption: a successful social movement campaign will lead at some 
point to a policy change, whereas an unsuccessful social movement campaign will 
lead to ongoing lack of success around the desired policy change. Accordingly, the 
capability and effectiveness of social movement activities at the state level are 
measured by evidence of a policy change becoming law within that state. The failure 
of the social movement is manifested in an absence of action on the movement’s policy 
preference.  
This approach allows us to capture the comprehensive, actual effects of 
competing social movements upon policy outcome as well as capture them as they 
impact upon different institutional forums, including state courts and state 
legislatures. But, beyond resolving the methodological and theoretical problems 
noted above, this approach has the added benefit of allowing us to distinguish 
between long-term effects attributable solely to the act of incorporating the policy into 
law, which is the focus of this current article, from both (a) the more immediate effects 
of a successful state-level social movement campaign, and (b) the more diffuse effects 
nationally related to social movement activity more generally.  
First, at the state-level, social movement activities are the important aspect of 
the subsequent decision to act by the respective policymaker—state courts for judicial 
orders, state legislatures and state governors for statutes, and the state population 
for ballot initiatives and state constitutional amendments. Consequently, social 
movement activities are operationalized in the current equation through individual 
consideration of each of these actions by these policymakers. Thus, we can capture 
the more immediate heightened focus on the policy issue that might be expected from 
an active social movement campaign, a well-watched court decision, or a highly-
reported legislative debate and vote. 
Second, the dynamics between social movements and counter-movements are 
important elements in framing regional and national policy discourses that may, in 
turn, shape the larger policy environment for state-level policy effects and policy 
outcomes.39 These regional and national policy discourses reflect the level of popular 
resonance around the policy shift that social movements have generated more 
generally. This aspect is operationalized in the current equation through 
incorporation of the accumulated policy shift evident at the regional and national 
level. When many new laws are introduced around one of the policy shifts in a large 
                                                 
37  Shauna F. Fisher, It Takes (at Least) Two to Tango: Fighting With Words in the Conflict Over Same-Sex 
Marriage, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 207, 207–30 (Scott Barclay, 
Anna-Maria Marshall, & Mary Bernstein eds., NYU Press 2009).  
38  See generally MUCCIARONI, supra note 7, at 210; ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 210. 
39  Fisher, supra note 37, at 210. 
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number of states, it is an indication of increasingly successful and effective social 
movement associated with that policy—the social movement is patently manifesting 
policy change in state after state.  
In the current analysis, our primary goal is to distinguish the long-term effects 
of creating a new policy—after all, it is incorporation into policy that is supposed to 
catalyze ongoing backlash—from the immediate effects of social movement 
campaigns. The present approach to incorporating social movement effects allows us 
to achieve this goal by effectively separating out the site and manifestation of social 
movements’ effects within a state from the ongoing effect of law itself in relation to 
the same policy shift.  
We assume that at the state-level, social movement activities are the 
important aspect of the subsequent decision to act by the respective policymaker—
state courts for judicial orders, state legislatures and state governors for statutes, 
and the state population for ballot initiatives and state constitutional amendments. 
Consequently, social movement activities are operationalized in the current equation 
through individual consideration of each of these actions by these policymakers. 
Thus, we can capture the more immediate heightened focus on the policy issue that 
might be expected from an active social movement campaign, a well-watched court 
decision, or a highly-reported legislative debate and vote.  
A similar approach is adopted for regional effects. We assume that when many 
new laws are introduced on the policy in a large number of states, it is an indication 
of increasingly successful and effective social movement associated with that policy—
the social movement is patently manifesting policy change in state after state. 
VI. STATISTICAL MODEL 
To investigate the effects of the policy change around marriage equality, we 
generated a cross-sectional time-series Gaussian regression equation that modeled 
changes in the level of popular support for marriage equality in the fifty states. To 
correctly model the expected effects from state action, we introduced ten explanatory 
variables into the equation. The description of the explanatory variables and their 
subsequent operationalization in the regression equation is largely self-evident from 
the information provided in Table One below.  
The equation structure in the regression is constructed to correctly model 
cross-sectional, time-series data by utilizing model characteristics to reduce the 
potential for inherent bias introduced by using repeated measures of these same 
locations over time. Since we were primarily interested in the ability of policy change 
to alter popular opinion within a state, the current regression equation relies on a 
fixed effects approach, which tends to prioritize within-location effects in the selected 
form of the regression equation. Such an approach allows the consideration of 
influences external to each respective state, but primarily highlights how such 
external influences shape opinion levels within each state. It uses a Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation approach to correctly parameterize the underlying model.   
Despite the incorporation of cross-sectional, time-series characteristics into the 
regression equation, the reliance on a Normal probability distribution in this case 
404 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:2 
aids the ease of interpretation of the results by reflecting many of the norms of 
interpretation traditionally associated with OLS regression models, including in 
interpreting strength, sign and significance. Consequently, for a one unit change in 
the relevant independent variable, we can expect a coefficient’s change in the percent 
of popular support for marriage equality evinced among a state’s population. And, the 
constant reflects the minimum baseline of popular support generally on marriage 
equality across the fifty states during this entire period, which is 28.6% in the current 
equation. 
 
Table One: Fixed-Effects Cross-Sectional Time Series Gaussian Regression Model of 
the Level of Public Support for Marriage Equality in the 50 US States, 1992 –201540 
Independent Variables Coeff (Std Err)  Min  
Max 
Policy Change Within State: 
Introduction of Policy Change into Law – Long-Term Effects  
 Number of Years State has Constitutional Prohibition  
Number of Years State Recognizes Marriage Equality 
  0.26  (0.09)*  Min: 0 Max: 
17 
  1.18  (0.22)*  Min: 0 Max: 
11 
 Number of Years State Recognizes Civil Unions   0.55  (0.18)*  Min: 0 Max: 
11 
   
Change in State Law – Social Movement Campaign Effects 
 State introduces Constitutional Prohibition of Same-
Sex Marriage 
 - 3.41  (0.70)*  Min: 0 Max: 
1 
 State’s Legislature Passes Bill on Marriage Equality/ 
Civil Unions 
    5.10  (0.84)*  Min: 0 
Max: 1 
 State’s Highest Court Supports Marriage Equality/ 
Civil Unions 
 - 1.89  (0.97)*  Min: 0 Max: 
1 
   
Policy Change Nationally and Regionally: 
 Number of States Nationally with Constitutional 
Prohibition 
  - 0.23  (0.03)*  Min: 0 
Max: 30 
 Number of States Nationally with Statutory 
Prohibition 
    0.01  (0.01)    Min: 0 
Max: 37 
 Number of States Nationally with Civil Unions     2.11  (0.13)*  Min: 0 
Max: 9 
 Number of States in Region with Marriage Equality     1.01  (0.25)*  Min: 0 
Max: 6 
 
Baseline Support 
 Constant    28.63  (0.37)* 
 
N = 1224    Groups = 51  [50 States + Washington DC]    Time: 23 consecutive years [1992-
2015] 
Correlation Structure: Fixed Effects (Within State) R2 = 0.64; Sigma = 5.67; Rho = .56 
F (10, 1163) = 206.24  P = 0.000  
* Significant at the .05 level  
_______________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
40  This table was created through original research by the authors related to this Article. 
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VII. FINDINGS ON POLICY BACKLASH 
  Consistent with our expectations, social movement campaigns and the policy 
change they manifest have immediate and substantial impact on the subsequent 
levels of popular support for marriage equality evinced in the respective state, 
according to the current regression equation. And, the short-term impact on popular 
support is in the expected direction. For example, the social movement campaigns 
that accompany a statewide referendum to successfully pass a state constitutional 
prohibition on same-sex marriage lead to an expected 3.41% decline in support for 
marriage equality in that same state in the year of the referendum. 
 More importantly, the results from the current regression equation speak 
directly to the two aspects of policy backlash of most interest to social movements: 
the question of different likelihood of policy backlash in different policy venues, and 
the question of the duration of any noted backlash effect.  
A. Policy Venues 
Consistent with the arguments of Klarman, Rosenberg and Mucciaroni, there 
appears to be a clear divergence, at least in the short term, between the levels of 
popular support that accrues from judicial action by a state’s highest court and the 
normal policy processes of a state legislature. 41  
In the current regression equation, an opinion by a state’s highest court 
endorsing such relationship recognition led to a 1.89% decline in support for marriage 
equality in the respective state in that same year. This finding appears to endorse 
those legal scholars who attribute part of the source of popular backlash on socially 
divisive policy issues, such as marriage equality, to the fact that it often arises from 
judicial action. 
And, further supporting their arguments, this decline associated with judicial 
action stands in direct contrast to the popular response when the respective state 
legislature successfully passed a bill permitting comprehensive relationship 
recognition—either marriage equality or civil unions—of same-sex couples. On those 
occasions, we can expect a 5.10% increase in subsequent support for marriage 
equality by a state’s population in that same year.  
 Overall, the current findings endorse the proposition that state legislative 
action around socially divisive policy issues appear to generate less popular backlash 
in the short-term than its judicial counterpart. On the policy issue of marriage 
equality, these findings are especially impactful. State courts were the major players 
in facilitating the public engagement over marriage equality from the early 1990s.42 
For example, in Vermont in 2000 state courts prompted the state legislature into 
action on the issue and in Massachusetts in 2004 and Iowa in 2009, they legalized 
same-sex marriage by judicial order. And, in California in 2008, Connecticut in 2008, 
                                                 
41  See generally KLARMAN, supra note 1; MUCCIARONI, supra note 7, at 243; ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 
107. 
42  Barclay & Fisher, supra note 34, at 96. 
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and New Jersey in 2013, they prompted state law that extra yard from existing 
domestic partnerships or civil unions to allow the state to eventually introduce same-
sex marriage. 
However, as we will discuss in the section immediately below, the impact of 
such backlash finding is somewhat countered by the short duration of the effect. At 
most, it can be identified as a temporary setback for the social movement.  
B. Duration of Effect  
Interestingly, the policy backlash appears to have both a short-term response 
related to judicial action noted above and, at least in the example of marriage 
equality, a longer-term, but opposing, version. As the current regression equation 
notes, the decline (of 3.41%) in popular support for marriage equality associated with 
the initial passage within a state of a constitutional prohibition is offset over time by 
a 0.26% increase in popular support for marriage equality within a state for each 
additional year that a state maintained a constitutional prohibition on same-sex 
marriage. That is, the initial negative effect slowly decays away to be replaced by a 
small, but significant, positive effect in support of marriage equality as the years 
since passage pass. Although just over a quarter of a percentage point increase per 
year is a small effect, it is worth noting that the state with earliest introduction of a 
proscriptive state constitutional amendment, Alaska, which passed one in 1998, is 
equivalent through 2014 of a 4.16% increase in expected popular support for marriage 
equality.    
This long-term effect is itself a form of policy backlash; a backlash in opinion 
against the incorporation of a proscription on same-sex marriage into law. Returning 
to the definition of opinion backlash borrowed from Bishin et al. of “a large, negative, 
and enduring shift in opinion against a policy,” the current long-term change in the 
direction of opinion certainly meets these parameters, even as it is counter-intuitive 
to think of policy backlash around marriage equality as the reaction against 
proscriptive marriage laws.43  
According to these regression results, a form of negative policy backlash occurs 
temporarily after a social movement introduces a change in policy via judicial action. 
But, over the longer-term, social movements can offset these negative effects as 
opinion shifts in support of contrary policies. Although surprising, these current 
findings are, in fact, consistent with recent empirical research on backlash by political 
scientists. Notably, Egan and Persily found that backlash followed a trend similar to 
our present finding; a short-term decline in support countered by long-term increases 
in popular support for marriage equality.44 Moreover, the present findings also 
validate the empirical research by Keck, Kreitzer et al., and Bishin et al. who question 
                                                 
43  Bishin et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
44  See generally Patrick J. Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in Support for Same-
Sex Marriage, THE POLLING REPORT, August 17, 2009.  
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the validity of any apparent long-term, anti-marriage equality backlash.45 As these 
scholars note, there appears to be no lasting negative impact from the introduction of 
statutory or state constitutional prohibitions on marriage equality. 
This finding on duration may explain why the existing scholarship on policy 
backlash is divided on its supposed effects. Legal scholars, including Klarman, 
postulate negative effects, especially from judicial decisions.46 In contrast, political 
scientists testing for these effects using a variety of empirical approaches have rarely 
found strong evidence for long-term policy backlash against the introduction of new 
policies on socially divisive issues, including abortion and marriage equality.47 The 
current research offers one point of possible reconciliation by recognizing a likely 
source of the divergence: the difference in focus between short-term negative effects 
and long-term positive responses associated with the same policy issue.  
CONCLUSION 
Given what we know about the potential impact of social movements pursuing 
policy change, the current findings should not be very surprising. Socially divisive 
policy issues become socially divisive precisely because existing social practices and 
the social norms that have long reinforced them become contested, often for the first 
time, by social movements and cause lawyers. The aim of the social movements is to 
de-naturalize these accepted practices until, at least for some, they are identified as 
an injury.  
As noted above in the case of same-sex marriage prior to the 1970s, a pervasive 
and unquestioned social norm can be a truly effective barrier to change for a very long 
time, even in the absence of a formal legal prohibition on the activity in question. It 
is the very act of contestation of the norms, and the social practices they support, by 
social movements and cause lawyers that usually catalyzes legislatures into codifying 
into law—or, in some cases, further codifying—the existing norm as a way of 
buttressing a previously accepted social practice. Thus, norms may become embedded 
into policy at the very point that they are most contested, and their formalization into 
law can be identified as a sign of vulnerability rather than a sign of increasing 
imperviousness to change.  
From this perspective, it is not unexpected that both proscriptive and 
permissive versions of a policy would appear contemporaneously across different 
states, as we see amply demonstrated in Figure One. In light of this underlying 
contestation, it is even logical that we might expect to see some states migrate in 
policy terms from proscriptive to permissive laws (and occasionally back again), as 
we witnessed with thirteen states around marriage equality before 2014. And, it 
explains the current findings. Although we see evidence of popular reaction in the 
                                                 
45  See generally Bishin et al., supra note 3; Keck, supra note 3; Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert, supra note 
3. 
46  KLARMAN, supra note 1. 
47  A variety of methodological approaches attempt to identify empirical evidence of backlash.  See Bishin 
et al., supra note 3; Keck, supra note 3, at 165; Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert, supra note 3. 
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immediate aftermath of cause lawyering that successfully leads to a court-ordered 
policy change toward permitting marriage equality or civil unions, in the long-term 
the regression equation notes that legal recognition of marriage equality and civil 
unions, as result from any actions by state policymakers including by judicial order, 
lead to increasing positive support for marriage equality. 
The very nature of this contestation also acts to mitigate any potential impact 
from policy backlash related to the introduction of a new policy, especially if 
introduced via judicial order. Instead, the current findings appear to support the idea 
that the backlash quickly dissipates and the trend of public support moves on to 
reflect the newly prevailing norm. This finding should bring some solace to social 
movements that are forced by circumstances or resources to pursue litigation 
strategies; the courts are not the problematic policy venue that they are often 
portrayed to be, as long as one has a slightly longer time horizon.   
Rather than sustained backlash, it appears that public support is most 
sensitive to the appearance of counter-majoritarian action by courts; notwithstanding 
that it is the role of constitutionally-charged courts to engage in such activity and 
that such courts rarely drift far from public opinion on a policy issue.48  In many ways, 
this finding is strangely reassuring in democratic terms: the public does not like when 
it appears that the judiciary is countering their democratic majoritarian decisions, 
but such a feeling does not preclude in the long term these same court decisions from 
embodying and enforcing policy choices that the public will increasingly support and 
endorse. 
 
                                                 
48  Barclay, supra note 4, at 120; Casillas, Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 4, at 79. 
